Scathing report on the USSS, to say the least....
Notice the woke culture critique?
Quote: These specific failures and breakdowns tie to the various deeper concerns the Panel has identified:
(1) a lack of clarity, in practice, regarding who has overall security ownership of a protectee’s site on the day of an event;
(2) corrosive cultural attitudes regarding resourcing and “doing more with less”;
(3) a troubling lack of critical thinking by Secret Service personnel both before, on, and after July 13, including regarding assessing the level of risk posed to certain protectees;
(4) the failure by experienced, senior-level Secret Service personnel to take necessary ownership regarding the security planning and execution at Butler;
(5) the lack of cohesion between Secret Service, state, and local security planning;
(6) an insufficiently experienced-based approach by the former president’s detail regarding its selection of agents to perform certain security critical tasks;
(7) a lack of sufficient continuous improvement and auditing mechanisms to enable details and field offices to actively learn and incorporate lessons to improve their protective mission capabilities;
(8 the lack of training facilities and commitment of time to
training on the Secret Service’s core protection mission, particularly when compared to other elite
“no fail” government units such as exist in federal law enforcement and the United States military;
and
(9) an ineffective “Speak Up” practice, connected with culture, which did not sufficiently prompt numerous agents who were aware of Crooks as a suspicious person prior to his commencing shooting to ensure that information was being passed on to former president Trump’s detail leadership.
The Panel has also made findings regarding certain budget and personnel
considerations
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/...gNd3-i8IHQ
Notice the woke culture critique?
Quote: These specific failures and breakdowns tie to the various deeper concerns the Panel has identified:
(1) a lack of clarity, in practice, regarding who has overall security ownership of a protectee’s site on the day of an event;
(2) corrosive cultural attitudes regarding resourcing and “doing more with less”;
(3) a troubling lack of critical thinking by Secret Service personnel both before, on, and after July 13, including regarding assessing the level of risk posed to certain protectees;
(4) the failure by experienced, senior-level Secret Service personnel to take necessary ownership regarding the security planning and execution at Butler;
(5) the lack of cohesion between Secret Service, state, and local security planning;
(6) an insufficiently experienced-based approach by the former president’s detail regarding its selection of agents to perform certain security critical tasks;
(7) a lack of sufficient continuous improvement and auditing mechanisms to enable details and field offices to actively learn and incorporate lessons to improve their protective mission capabilities;
(8 the lack of training facilities and commitment of time to
training on the Secret Service’s core protection mission, particularly when compared to other elite
“no fail” government units such as exist in federal law enforcement and the United States military;
and
(9) an ineffective “Speak Up” practice, connected with culture, which did not sufficiently prompt numerous agents who were aware of Crooks as a suspicious person prior to his commencing shooting to ensure that information was being passed on to former president Trump’s detail leadership.
The Panel has also made findings regarding certain budget and personnel
considerations
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/...gNd3-i8IHQ
